South Korea

38 North | English | AcademicThink | Jan. 2, 2026 | North Korea

North Korea’s recent year-end Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) plenary meeting provided limited updates on preparations for the Ninth Party Congress, indicating that planning remains in early stages with several pending issues unresolved. The meeting emphasized the importance of completing major projects and setting realistic five-year development plans before the Congress convenes. A preparatory committee is yet to be fully established, with tasks including drafting amendments to the Party rules and arranging delegate elections still underway.

The Ninth Party Congress, as the highest leadership organ of the Party convened every five years, is expected to review accomplishments since the Eighth Congress in 2021 and lay out policy directions for the next five years. Although the Party decided to hold the Congress in June 2025, no date has been set, and preparations appear slower compared to the lead-up to the Eighth Congress. Historical precedent suggests that organizing the Congress typically requires several weeks of intensive preparation from the formation of the preparatory committee to delegate selection and final announcements.

North Korea’s leadership, under Kim Jong Un, has normalized regular Party meetings and Congresses since 2016, using them as key venues for leadership consolidation and strategic direction. The timeline for the Ninth Congress will depend on how quickly outstanding tasks are resolved, and future updates, including possible Politburo meetings, are expected to provide more clarity on the timing and content of the Congress.

38 North | English | AcademicThink | Jan. 2, 2026 | North Korea

The increasing visibility of Kim Jong Un’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae, amid uncertainties about his health, has sparked speculation about North Korea’s future leadership. While her public role is unprecedented and may hint at succession plans, historical patterns suggest caution, as previous transitions involved complex elite management, propaganda, and military demonstrations to establish legitimacy. A female successor would face notable challenges in DPRK’s patriarchal society, whereas a male heir might receive broader acceptance but still requires political and military credentials. The timing and nature of the succession process could vary, resembling either a lengthy apprenticeship like Kim Jong Il’s or a rapid ascendancy as with Kim Jong Un.

Past successions in North Korea showed distinct approaches shaped by differing domestic and international contexts. Kim Jong Il’s rise (1970s-1994) occurred during a relatively stable era that allowed gradual consolidation of power through ideological campaigns linking his legitimacy to his father Kim Il Sung. In contrast, Kim Jong Un’s succession (2008-2011) happened amid international isolation and economic challenges, with his father accelerating the transfer of power due to deteriorating health, elevating a new generation of loyal elites while sidelining old guard figures like Jang Song-thaek.

Military leadership credentials have been critical in legitimizing North Korean rulers. Kim Jong Il bypassed direct military experience by leveraging propaganda tied to his father’s legacy and instituted “military-first” policies to reinforce his regime. Kim Jong Un lacked traditional military credentials and instead “invented” military authority early on through appointments and demonstrations of force, such as the 2010 Yeonpyeong artillery strike and subsequent missile tests, to consolidate control and signal regime strength.

Current internal dynamics reveal a potential rivalry between Kim Ju Ae and Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, who holds significant party influence and is considered a viable immediate successor if Kim Jong Un dies suddenly. However, ideological norms favoring male heirs and generational transfer theories elevate Kim Ju Ae’s candidacy over Kim Yo Jong’s long-term prospects. The existence of a possible son adds complexity, as patriarchal norms could make a male successor more acceptable. Kim Jong Un himself faces the delicate task of empowering a successor without undermining his own authority, a balancing act influenced by lessons from past transitions and the risk of accelerated power shifts.

Signs of an emerging succession process may include intensified propaganda showcasing the successor’s military and political roles, reorganization of elites loyal to the heir, and policy initiatives aimed at consolidating power and addressing socio-economic and security challenges. The successor will likely continue “military-first” policies, using military demonstrations both as legitimacy tools and means to suppress dissent within the armed forces. Resistance from within the military could lead to further purges to solidify control.

Several scenarios could unfold: in the short term, a politically established figure like Kim Yo Jong might take over in the event of Kim Jong Un’s sudden incapacitation, while younger heirs remain unprepared. If a male heir emerges, patriarchal societal norms suggest the female successor’s prospects diminish. Even though the number of women in leadership roles has increased, significant political power remains unlikely for female delegates under existing structures, with conservative party factions poised to influence succession outcomes.

Understanding the historical patterns and tactical dynamics of past North Korean successions is crucial for anticipating future developments. While no succession process is predetermined, recognizing indicators such as elite reshuffling, propaganda shifts, and military activity can help policymakers prepare for potential transitions. A nuanced grasp of these factors will support more proactive and informed international responses, mitigating risks and seizing opportunities during North Korea’s eventual leadership change.

초고령사회 일본의 외국인력 도입 동향과 정책적 시사점

Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade | Local Language | AcademicThink | Jan. 2, 2026 | UndeterminedEmployment

The article examines employment trends in Japan's manufacturing sector in the context of a super-aged society and the COVID-19 pandemic. It highlights that manufacturing employment experienced a relatively rapid recovery after a slight decline in early 2020, contrasting with more severe shocks seen in service sectors like air travel, food, and accommodation. Compared to major OECD countries, Japan's manufacturing employment faced smaller disruptions.

Employment impacts varied within manufacturing, with temporary and daily workers and self-employed individuals with employees experiencing larger shocks. In contrast, regular employees and self-employed individuals without employees saw little impact. Larger firms with 300 or more employees rebounded quickly and surpassed pre-pandemic employment levels, while smaller firms had slower recoveries.

Analyzing industry-specific trends, pharmaceuticals showed continuous growth before and after the pandemic’s onset. Other sectors such as electronic components, computers, transport equipment, and furniture also improved. However, several industries including non-metallic minerals, primary metals, metalworking, and printing experienced notable employment declines after COVID-19.