South Korea

Yonhap | English | News | Jan. 23, 2026 | Shifting Geopolitical Alliances

Victor Cha, a U.S. expert and president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department at CSIS, proposed the creation of a "collective economic deterrence" pact involving South Korea, the United States, Japan, and other countries to counter China's economic pressure. This proposal comes amid concerns of possible Chinese retaliation toward South Korea following its nuclear-powered submarine project, which the U.S. has approved. The pact aims to collectively respond to any economic coercion by China, similar to the collective security principle of NATO’s Article 5, thereby deterring Chinese economic aggression rather than initiating a trade war.

Cha described China as an unreliable partner for South Korea, accusing Beijing of failing to curb North Korea's nuclear activities and ignoring UN sanctions. He emphasized that no single country in the region can effectively counter China alone, but collectively the countries possess enough leverage. The pact would treat coercion against one member as coercion against all, triggering automatic retaliation, which could impose real costs on Beijing and make it reconsider its pressure tactics.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has sought balanced relations with both China and the U.S., exemplified by his recent summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping. However, Cha believes this amicable approach is unlikely to withstand the fallout from the submarine deal, as China has historically retaliated against South Korea economically in response to geopolitical disputes. He called for stronger trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, highlighting their substantial trade with China and leverage over key Chinese imports worth over $23 billion.

Cha urged the Trump administration, which holds the G7 presidency in 2027, to lead efforts in forming this economic deterrence pact and to avoid measures like tariffs on allies. He recommended that Trump explicitly oppose China's economic pressure tactics during his upcoming visit to Beijing in April to deter further coercion against allies, particularly South Korea, following the submarine project agreement.

38 North | English | AcademicThink | Jan. 23, 2026 | North Korea

The latest US National Security Strategy (NSS) marks a significant shift in Washington’s approach to the Korean Peninsula by excluding North Korean denuclearization as a central concern and redirecting deterrence responsibilities primarily onto allies, especially South Korea. This shift reflects a reprioritization in US strategy that reduces direct engagement and increases South Korea’s burden in managing North Korea, resulting in a more volatile and unpredictable security environment.

North Korea views this strategic retrenchment as an opportunity to strengthen its position by adopting a more confrontational stance toward South Korea, potentially codifying a hostile inter-Korean doctrine at its upcoming Ninth Party Congress. Its military provocations serve a dual purpose: challenging South Korea’s control over contested maritime and air defense zones in a calculated manner to avoid large-scale escalation, and provoking political divisions within South Korea related to responses and the credibility of US extended deterrence.

South Korea is responding to these provocations by significantly increasing its defense budget and investing in advanced military capabilities, signaling a shift toward greater self-reliance and reduced dependence on the US nuclear umbrella. Discussions on indigenous nuclear options and strategic assets have entered mainstream political debate, reflecting growing doubts about the reliability of US deterrence.

The absence of North Korea from the US NSS increases the risk of an accelerated arms race on the Peninsula, compounded by US global strategic actions that raise perceptions of unpredictability and willingness to use force. This dynamic incentivizes both Pyongyang and Seoul to engage in competitive military buildup and riskier postures, especially around sensitive zones like the Northern Limit Line and Korea Air Defense Identification Zone, with a heightened chance of destabilizing escalation.

Underlying this situation are flawed assumptions within US policy that ambiguity and burden-shifting will maintain stability. Without clear communication, senior-level coordination, and explicit crisis management policies—including well-defined red lines—burden-shifting encourages risk-taking by all parties. The evolving arms competition and alliance asymmetries on the Peninsula increase the likelihood of costly miscalculations and military adventurism unless strategic signaling and allied coordination improve significantly.

Joongang Ilbo | English | News | Jan. 23, 2026 | Regulatory Enforcement Actions

South Korea's Fair Trade Commission (FTC) has fined four major commercial banks—Shinhan Bank, Woori Bank, Hana Bank, and KB Kookmin Bank—a total of 272 billion won ($183.7 million) for allegedly colluding on loan-to-value (LTV) ratios in real estate lending. The banks exchanged internal documents related to LTV ratios and coordinated lending limits from March 2022 to March 2024, restricting competition in the mortgage loan market.

The FTC estimated that the collusion helped the banks generate approximately 6.8 trillion won in interest earnings by reducing uncertainty about competitors’ strategies and avoiding competition on LTV ratios. These four banks collectively hold about 60 percent of South Korea’s real estate mortgage loan market, limiting consumer choice and affecting lending conditions.

The collusion particularly harmed small and midsize enterprises and small business owners, who often have lower credit ratings and rely heavily on secured loans. The case is notable as the first enforcement under a revised fair trade law effective December 30, 2021, which prohibits anticompetitive collusion involving the exchange of sensitive business information.