South Korea

38 North | English | AcademicThink | Jan. 23, 2026 | North Korea

The latest US National Security Strategy (NSS) marks a significant shift in Washington’s approach to the Korean Peninsula by excluding North Korean denuclearization as a central concern and redirecting deterrence responsibilities primarily onto allies, especially South Korea. This shift reflects a reprioritization in US strategy that reduces direct engagement and increases South Korea’s burden in managing North Korea, resulting in a more volatile and unpredictable security environment.

North Korea views this strategic retrenchment as an opportunity to strengthen its position by adopting a more confrontational stance toward South Korea, potentially codifying a hostile inter-Korean doctrine at its upcoming Ninth Party Congress. Its military provocations serve a dual purpose: challenging South Korea’s control over contested maritime and air defense zones in a calculated manner to avoid large-scale escalation, and provoking political divisions within South Korea related to responses and the credibility of US extended deterrence.

South Korea is responding to these provocations by significantly increasing its defense budget and investing in advanced military capabilities, signaling a shift toward greater self-reliance and reduced dependence on the US nuclear umbrella. Discussions on indigenous nuclear options and strategic assets have entered mainstream political debate, reflecting growing doubts about the reliability of US deterrence.

The absence of North Korea from the US NSS increases the risk of an accelerated arms race on the Peninsula, compounded by US global strategic actions that raise perceptions of unpredictability and willingness to use force. This dynamic incentivizes both Pyongyang and Seoul to engage in competitive military buildup and riskier postures, especially around sensitive zones like the Northern Limit Line and Korea Air Defense Identification Zone, with a heightened chance of destabilizing escalation.

Underlying this situation are flawed assumptions within US policy that ambiguity and burden-shifting will maintain stability. Without clear communication, senior-level coordination, and explicit crisis management policies—including well-defined red lines—burden-shifting encourages risk-taking by all parties. The evolving arms competition and alliance asymmetries on the Peninsula increase the likelihood of costly miscalculations and military adventurism unless strategic signaling and allied coordination improve significantly.

1500원 환율의 공습… 식탁 물가 '마지막 방어선' 무너졌다 [프라이스&amp]

Hankyung | Local Language | News | Jan. 23, 2026 | UndeterminedInflation

The South Korean government announced support measures including discounts on mackerel of up to 60% and plans to diversify import sources in response to a sharp rise in imported mackerel prices, driven by decreased catches in Norway and exchange rate effects. Import prices for major agricultural, livestock, and fishery products increased by more than 8% at the end of last year, with staple items such as napa cabbage, radish, and cutlassfish experiencing price surges of at least 50%, and in some cases doubling year-on-year. This raises concerns over grocery price inflation ahead of the Lunar New Year.

Data from the Korea Customs Service as of December showed import unit prices for 105 agricultural, livestock, and fishery products rose 8.5% year-on-year. Radish and napa cabbage prices surged by over 100%, and finished kimchi products rose nearly 20%, impacting costs for both households and restaurants. Seafood prices have also increased significantly; cutlassfish rose 54.3%, halibut 42.5%, octopus 35.2%, and mackerel 30.7%. These increases reflect both high absolute prices and substantial price pressures on consumers.

Other imported items heavily reliant on foreign supply also saw steep price hikes. Frozen lamb surged 65.1%, chilled lamb 27.7%, pineapple rose 31.5%, and coffee prices increased 27.6%. These products have limited domestic alternatives, making consumers likely to bear these increased costs. Industry experts expect import unit price pressures to persist, largely due to complex global factors and especially the exchange rate which is nearing 1,500 won per US dollar, significantly impacting import costs.

Yonhap | English | News | Jan. 23, 2026 | North Korea

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung revealed that North Korea is producing enough nuclear material annually to build 10 to 20 new nuclear weapons, emphasizing the critical need to resume diplomatic talks with Pyongyang to curb its nuclear weapons program. This disclosure, considered rare and based on classified intelligence shared by South Korean and U.S. agencies, highlights North Korea's ongoing expansion of its nuclear arsenal.

North Korea is operating highly enriched uranium production facilities in Yongbyon and Kangson, along with plutonium production at Yongbyon. These facilities can generate dozens of kilograms of nuclear material a year, sufficient for multiple weapons. Estimates from the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses indicate North Korea possessed between 115 and 131 uranium-based weapons and 15 to 19 plutonium-based weapons as of 2025, potentially rising to 216 uranium-based and 27 plutonium-based weapons by 2030, and further increasing through 2040.

President Lee stated that while complete denuclearization is the ideal outcome, the reality suggests North Korea is unlikely to abandon its nuclear program voluntarily. He proposed a practical approach starting with halting North Korea’s nuclear activities, then pursuing gradual reductions, and ultimately aiming for full denuclearization. Lee’s use of the term "disarmament" signals a renewed push to bring North Korea back to negotiations, despite Pyongyang’s firm stance that its nuclear arsenal is non-negotiable and essential for national security.